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Abstract
This paper studies the application of the two most popular non-expected
utility (NEU) models -Choquet Expected Utility (CEU) and Maximin Expected
Utility (CEU)- to dynamic choice situations in a purely subjective framework. We
give an appropriate version of the reduction of compound acts axiom, that states
the equivalence between a static and a dynamic choice situation. We show that
if consequentialism -only those consequences that can be reached do matter- is
additionally assumed, then a monotonic constant linear representation degenerate
into expected utility. We envisage two different ways to resolve this problem for
the cases where the representation is a CEU or a MEU one. One way consists to
weaken the reduction of compound acts axiom, which does not hold on all events.
Another way is to relax consequentialism. Then we axiomatically characterize an
updating rule for both approaches allowing recursion in several cases.
Key-words: Choquet expected utility; Maximin expected utility; Consequentialism; Re-
duction of compound acts; Dynamic choice; Updating
JEL classification numbers: D 81, D 83
1 Introduction
In decision theory under uncertainty, typical violations of the expected utility (EU)
paradigm have lead to the development of Non-expected utility (NEU) criteria. In this
paper, we will focus on the most popular approaches, namely the Choquet Expected
Utility (CEU) model and the Maximin Expected Utility (MEU) model. These models,
which do not assume that the decision maker’s beliefs are represented by a single addi-
tive prior, have been successfully applied to various economics situations. However, a
wide class of situations involves sequential resolution of the uncertainty, and the use of
NEU models in this context is a major concern.
Since seminal works of Hammond (1988), Machina (1989), Segal (1990) and Karni
and Schmeidler (1991) in a risky setting, it is well-known that NEU models cannot
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accommodate a backward induction procedure, which is often seen as the conjunction
of three different principles:
• Dynamic consistency: the decision maker’s preferences are unchanged throughout
the decision tree;
• Consequentialism: the decision maker’s preferences are only dependent on the
information received. In particular, counterfactuals outcomes are not relevant;
• Reduction of compound lotteries: the decision maker is indifferent between a
static and a dynamic choice situation, provided the final consequences be the
same. In other words, lotteries are reduced by probability calculus.
Together with standards axioms, these three principles imply expected utility in
choice under risk. In settings of knightian uncertainty, where probability distributions
on the outcomes are not given, relations among these axioms is unclear. The main
reason is that the objects of choice are Savage acts, which are maps from the state
space into the set of final consequences. It does not allow to perform an intuitive
formalization of the reduction of compound lotteries axiom in a purely subjective set-
up.
That is why previous works in the literature often link the first and the third prin-
ciple into a same axiom, called dynamic consistency in Epstein and Le Breton (1993),
Sarin and Wakker (1998), Ghirardato (2002), Epstein and Schneider (2003), Eichberger
et al. (2005) and Dominiak and Lefort (2009).
However, these works differ, depending on the algebra of events. In particular, if
the information structure is represented by a given and fixed filtration, then expected
utility can be avoided. This paper first aims at showing that the differences between
the results in the existing literature can be axiomatically explained. Precisely, we show
that i) consequentialism and reduction of compound acts together with a monotonic
constant linear representation imply expected utility and ii) if the decision maker’s
preferences are represented by a CEU or a MEU form, a weakening of reduction of
compound acts allow to avoid expected utility in the same way than Sarin and Wakker
(1998) and Epstein and Schneider (2003). Concerning CEU preferences, a necessary
and sufficient condition to weak reduction of compound acts and consequentialism hold
together is that the capacity be additive on a part of the algebra of events. In the MEU
framework, the set of priors must be rectangular.
These conditions constitute strong restrictions on NEU criteria, and lead us to relax
the consequentialism assumption. Then the main difficulty is to obtain well-defined
conditional preferences in order to use a backward induction procedure. This goal can
be reached in several situations, for which we axiomatically characterize an updating
rule allowing a recursive representation of the preferences. These situations are the
same for the two approaches (CEU and MEU), which coincide when the set of priors
is the core of a convex capacity.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we introduce
notations and axioms, and we show that a monotonic constant linear representation
cannot accommodate both reduction of compound acts and consequentialism. More-
over, we present our updating rule in an example. Section 3 and 4 report results for
CEU and MEU preferences, respectively. Section 5 concludes.
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2 Set-up, axioms and motivations
We consider a finite state space S such that |S| = N ≥ 3. A state in S is described
by s. An event is a subset of S and for all B ⊂ S we note Bc the event S\B. We
note Σ = 2S the algebra of S. The set of outcomes is X such that X = [x∗;x∗] ⊂ R,
with x∗ > x∗. The set of simple acts (measurable functions taking only finite values) is
noted A ⊆ XN = {f : S −→ X}. We identify X with the subset of the constant acts
in A. We write f =E g if f(s) = g(s) for all s in E and f = xEy denotes the binary
act yielding f(s) = x when s ∈ E and f(s) = y when s ∈ Ec.
A decision maker (DM for short) is characterized by a class of binary relations
{<E}E∈Σ on A. For all E in Σ, <E compares acts when she is informed that the right
state is in E. When E = S, <S is noted < and compares acts when no information is
given to the DM.
First assume that {<E}E∈Σ can all be represented by monotonic constant-linear
functionals with certainty equivalents, as axiomatized by Ghirardato and Marinacci
(2001) and Ghirardato et al. (2001, 2003) in a static framework. Such a representation
of the DM’s preference generalizes the NEU models examined in this paper, in the sense
that it constitutes the weakest model achieving a separation of cardinal utility and a
unique representation of beliefs. Separation of utility and beliefs means that tastes are
constant whereas beliefs can change with new information. For any E in Σ, we note
IE[u(.)] the criterion representing <E so that f <E g if and only if IE[u(f)] ≥ IE[u(g)]
for all f and g in A. When E = S, we note I[u(.)] the representation of <. The only
requirements on {IE}E∈Σ are (i) monotonicity, i.e. f ≥ g implies IE(f) ≥ IE(g) for all
f, g ∈ A, and (ii) constant linearity, i.e. IE(af + b) = aIE(f) + b for all f ∈ A, a ∈ R+
and b ∈ R. The utility function u : X −→ R represents {<E}E∈Σ on X, and it is
unique up to a positive affine transformation.
Therefore, for any f , IE[u(f)] = IE[u(f(s1)), ..., u(f(sN))]. Let x and y in X be
certainty equivalents of f given E and Ec respectively, such that x ∼E f and y ∼Ec f .
Then IE[u(f)] = u(x) and IEc [u(f)] = u(y).
A common assumption in risky situations is that the DM reduces a dynamic de-
cision problem to a static one by probability calculus. Such an assumption is named
”Reduction of compound lotteries”(RCL). In situations of knightian uncertainty, the
set-up is necessarily static when the objects of choice are acts, that are maps into the
set of final outcomes. Indeed, compound acts (or strategies, i.e. a complete set of moves
through the sequential decision tree), that pay another act (a sub-act) are not the ob-
jects of choice in the Savage framework. Therefore, in order to formalize a reduction of
compound acts assumption, assume that the DM has to make a choice between the act
f and the binary act xEy. The former describes a static situation whereas the latter
depicts a dynamic situation, because x and y are recursively calculated. It may happen
that the DM be not indifferent between a sequential resolution of the uncertainty and a
one-shot one. When probabilities are not known, a similar assumption to RCL is that
the DM be indifferent between xEy and f , i.e. she reduces a dynamic situation to a
static one.
Axiom 1 (Reduction of Compound Acts) For all E in Σ, f in A and x and y in X, if
f ∼E x and f ∼Ec y then f ∼ xEy.
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It implies I[u(f)] = I[u(xEy)], hence the following recursive relation
I[u(f)] = I[IE[u(f)], ..., IE[u(f)], IEc [u(f)], ..., IEc [u(f)]] (1)
holds true and, with a slight abuse of notations, I[u(f)] = I[IE[u(f)], IEc [u(f)]]. It
allows to resolve a dynamic decision problem by backward induction. Moreover, the
following property is satisfied.
Property 1 (Dynamic Consistency) For all E in Σ and f and g in A, f <E g and
f <Ec g imply f < g.
Indeed, f <E g and f <Ec g if and only if (by transitivity) x <E x′ and y <Ec y′,
where x ∼E f, x′ ∼E g, y ∼Ec f and y′ ∼Ec g. By monotonicity, xEy < x′Ey′ and then
RCA implies f < g.
It is worth noting that such a version of dynamic consistency is specific to Savage
acts. Indeed, when the decision maker’s preferences are defined on strategies, or com-
pound lotteries1, dynamic consistency is defined differently. For instance, let N = 4,
p({s1, s2}) = p1, p({s3, s4}) = p2 and let l = (l1, p1; l2, p2) be a compound lottery yield-
ing sub-lotteries l1 = (x1, q1;x2, q2) and l2 = (x3, q3;x4, q4). Then dynamic consistency
implies that if l1 <{s1,s2} l′1 and l2 <{s3,s4} l′2 then l < (l′1, p1; l′2, p2) = l′. In other words,
it means that if the continuation of the strategy l is preferred to the continuation of l′
whatever new information learned, then the strategy l is preferred to the strategy l′.
In a purely subjective set-up, a similar definition should be: if f <E g and f <Ec g
then xEy < x′Ey′, with x, y, x′ and y′ defined as above. Therefore, axiom 1 does not
imply itself property 1, and an additional dynamic extension of monotonicity, defined
as dynamic consistency in a risky setting, is needed.
For convenience when updating, the following assumption, broadly discussed in
Machina (1989), is generally made in dynamic models of choice under uncertainty:
Axiom 2 (Consequentialism) For all f and g in A and E in Σ, f =E g implies f ∼E g.
Let x and y in X such that x > y. W.l.o.g. we normalize the utility function so
that u(x) = 1 and u(y) = 0. Then, for any A in Σ, I[u(xAy)] = I(1A), where 1A is the
characteristic function of event A, denotes the individual evaluation of the likelihood
of A. The conditional evaluation of event A given event E is noted IE(1A).
Proposition 1 Let {<E}E∈Σ be a class of preference relations on A. Then the follow-
ing two statements are equivalent:
i {<E}E∈Σ satisfy axioms 1 and 2 and it is represented by the class of monotonic
constant linear functionals {IE[u(.)]}E∈Σ;
ii There exists a unique probability measure p : Σ → [0, 1] such that < is repre-
sented by
I : f 7−→
∫
S
u(f)dp (2)
1As in Kreps and Porteus (1978), Karni and Schmeidler (1991) and Volij (1994).
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Moreover, each conditional evaluation {IE[u(.)]}E∈Σ is also an expected utility
functional using the bayesian updating of p, denoted pE, and the utility function
u(.).
Proof (ii) =⇒ (i) is straightforward. We prove (i) =⇒ (ii). Let p : Σ → R be
a set function such that I(1A) = p(A) for all A in Σ. pE(A) = IE(1A) is defined
similarly. Then p satisfies the following properties: p(∅) = I(1∅) = 0, p(S) = I(1S) =
1,∀A,B ∈ Σ, A ⊆ B ⇒ I(1A) ≤ I(1B) ⇒ p(A) ≤ p(B). Therefore, p is a capacity
across binary acts2. We have to prove that p satisfies the additional following property:
p(A) + p(B) = p(A ∪ B) for all disjoints A and B. In this case, p is finitely additive
and it is a probability. By axiom 1, for all E ∈ Σ and A ⊂ E,
I(1A) = I[IE(1A)] (3)
hence I(1A) = I(pE(A), 0) = p(E) · pE(A). Moreover, by axiom 2, for all B in Σ such
that B ∩ E = A, IE(1B) = IE(1A) and then
pE(A) =
p(A ∩ E)
p(E)
(4)
for all A and E in Σ. Let S = (A ∪ B ∪ C), with A ∩ B = B ∩ C = A ∩ C = ∅. With
relation (4),
• if E = (A ∪B),
I(1A∪C) = I[IA∪B(1A∪C), IC(1A∪C)] = I[
p(A)
p(A ∪B) , 1] = p(C)+[1−p(C)]·
p(A)
p(A ∪B)
(5)
I(1B∪C) = p(C) + [1− p(C)] · p(B)
p(A ∪B) (6)
• if E = (A ∪ C),
I(1A∪B) = p(B) + [1− p(B)] · p(A)
p(A ∪ C) (7)
I(1B∪C) = p(B) + [1− p(B)] · p(C)
p(A ∪ C) (8)
• if E = (B ∪ C),
I(1A∪B) = p(A) + [1− p(A)] · p(B)
p(B ∪ C) (9)
I(1A∪C) = p(A) + [1− p(A)] · p(C)
p(B ∪ C) (10)
Because (6)+(7)+(10)=(5)+(8)+(9), we have
[1−p(B)] · p(A)− p(C)
p(A ∪ C) + [1−p(A)] ·
p(C)− p(B)
p(B ∪ C) + [1−p(C)] ·
p(B)− p(A)
p(A ∪B) = 0 (11)
2See Ghirardato et al. (2001), proposition 14.
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for any partition of S, hence p(A)+p(B∪C) = 1, p(B)+p(A∪C) = 1, p(C)+p(A∪B) =
1. Then (5) implies p(A) + p(C) = p(A ∪ C), (6) implies p(B) + p(C) = p(B ∪ C) and
(7) implies p(A) + p(B) = p(A ∪ B). Therefore p(A) + p(B) + p(C) = 1 and p is a
probability. 
Because MEU and CEU models are monotonic and constant linear representations of
{<E}E∈Σ, the main implication of this result is that such criteria cannot simultaneously
satisfy axioms 1 and 2. Otherwise they degenerate into expected utility. Then a way
to preserve ambiguity and ambiguity attitudes is to weaken RCA.
Axiom 3 (Weak Reduction of Compound Acts) There exists E in Σ such that for all
f in A and x and y in X, if f ∼E x and f ∼Ec y then f ∼ xEy.
It implies RCA only for a subset of events. We will see in the next section that this
weakening may be useful in order to avoid additive beliefs.
Another way to avoid expected utility is to do not assume the consequentialism
axiom. However, the updating rules axiomatized for NEU preferences assume this
axiom3. Precisely, consequentialism imposes two distinct requirements:
1. The updating rule gives no likelihood to events outside of E;
2. The updating rule is unique, in the sense that the DM always uses the same
updating rule with no regards for counterfactual outcomes.
Point 1 can be seen as a basic normative requirement. Moreover, if it is not assumed,
then a dynamic decision problem cannot, in general, be resolved by backward induction.
However, we will see that even if point 2 is not satisfied, backward induction can be
used in several situations.
Our approach allows to compute IE(1A) when A ⊂ E or when Ec ⊂ A for the two
NEU criteria considered in this paper -MEU and CEU. Therefore, under RCA, even
if consequentialism does not universally hold, there are situations where conditional
preferences are well-defined. As illustrated in the example below, it allows to describe
Ellsberg-type preferences whereas the DM’s preferences have a recursive structure.
Example 1 Consider the following dynamic extension of the Ellsberg paradox, as pro-
posed by Epstein and Schneider (2003). A MEU decision maker is facing an urn with
30 red balls and 60 blue or green balls. At time 1, a ball is drawn and the decision
maker knows whether this ball is green or not. At time 2, the color of this ball is fully
revealed to the decision maker. The state space is S = {R,B,G}, where R,B and G
have obvious signification, and conditional preferences are {<R∪B,<G}. A possible set
of priors may be:
P =
{
p =
(
1
3
, β,
2
3
− β
)
|β ∈
[
1
6
;
1
2
]}
(12)
Several bets, that are maps from S to X = {0, 1}, are proposed to the DM. Ellsberg-
type preferences are (1, 0, 0) < (0, 1, 0) and (0, 1, 1) < (1, 0, 1), where any bet can be
described as (x,R; y,B; z,G), with x, y, z ∈ X. Assume that the utility u : X → R is
3See for instance Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993), Pires (2002), Wang (2003) and Eichberger et al.
(2007).
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linear. Then, by proposition 4, if axiom 2 and 3 (with E = R ∪B) hold, then the DM
considers the rectangular set of priors Q such that:
Q =
q =
1
3
1
3
+ β′
1
3
+ β
, β
1
3
+ β′
1
3
+ β
,
2
3
− β′
 | β, β′ ∈ [1
6
,
1
2
] (13)
As noted by Epstein and Schneider (2003), Q is not consistent with Ellsberg-type pref-
erences. That is why to simultaneously keep reduction of compound acts and conse-
quentialism may be problematic, even if the former is weakened. Therefore, we propose
to relax consequentialism. Then, by proposition 5, axiom 1 delivers an updating rule
yielding the following conditional preferences:
min
pR∪B∈PR∪B
∫
S
(1, 0, 0)dpR∪B =
2
3
>
1
3
= min
pR∪B∈PR∪B
∫
S
(0, 1, 0)dpR∪B (14)
min
pR∪B∈PR∪B
∫
S
(1, 0, 1)dpR∪B =
2
5
<
3
5
= min
pR∪B∈PR∪B
∫
S
(0, 1, 1)dpR∪B (15)
according to ex-ante preferences.
3 Choquet Expected Utility
An important class of NEU models is the CEU one. In this model, the beliefs are
represented by a Choquet capacity, i.e. a set function ν : Σ→ [0, 1] such that ν(∅) = 0,
ν(S) = 1 and ∀A,B ∈ Σ, A ⊆ B ⇒ ν(A) ≤ ν(B). Wakker (1989) and Ghirardato et
al. (2001, 2003) axiomatize the Choquet Expected utility representation in a Savage
framework.
Definition 1 (CEU) The preference relation is represented by a Choquet Expected Util-
ity functional I : A −→ R if there exist a unique capacity ν and a real-valued function
u : X → R, unique up to a positive affine transformation, s.t. the value of any act f is
given by:
I : f 7−→
∫
S
u[f(s)]dν(s)
Therefore, {<E}E∈Σ satisfy CEU if and only if each preference relation <E is repre-
sented by the Choquet integral of utility
∫
S
u(f)dνE, where νE denotes the conditional
set function for ν(.) given E. Finally, note that the Choquet expectation of 1A allows
to define the capacity of event A: I(1A) = ν(A) and IE(1A) = νE(A) for all A and E
in Σ.
The main implication of the proposition 1 is that we have to make a choice between
consequentialism and reduction of compound acts when assuming that {<E}E∈Σ are
represented by the CEU model. A current way in the literature is to release RCA in
WRCA.
Proposition 2 Let {<E}E∈Σ be a class of preference relations on A. Then the follow-
ing two statements are equivalent:
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i {<E}E∈Σ satisfy CEU and axioms 2 and 3;
ii There exist E and Ec in Σ and a unique probability measure p : {E,Ec} −→ [0; 1]
such that the preference relation < is represented by:
I : f 7−→ p(E) ·
∫
S
u(f)dνE + p(E
c) ·
∫
S
u(f)dνEc (16)
and, moreover,
∀A ∈ Σ, νB(A) = ν(A ∩B)
p(B)
(17)
where B ∈ {E,Ec}.
Proof The implication (ii) =⇒ (i) is straightforward. We prove (i) =⇒ (ii). Let
S = (A ∪B ∪ C), with A ∩B = B ∩ C = A ∩ C = ∅, E = A ∪B, and x, y, z ∈ X such
that x > y > z. Let xAz ∼ yEz, hence
∫
S
u(xAz)dν =
∫
S
u(yEz)dν under CEU. Then,
u(z) + [u(x)− u(z)]ν(A) = u(z) + [u(y)− u(z)]ν(E) (18)
if and only if, by axioms 2 and 3,
I
[∫
E
u(xAz)dνE),
∫
Ec
u(xAz)dνEc
]
= I
[∫
E
u(yEz)dνE),
∫
Ec
u(yEz)dνEc
]
(19)
if and only if
I
[∫
E
u(xA∪Cz)dνE),
∫
Ec
u(xA∪Cz)dνEc
]
= I
[∫
E
u(yEx)dνE),
∫
Ec
u(yEx)dνEc
]
(20)
that implies
∫
S
u(xA∪Cz)dν =
∫
S
u(yEx)dν. Then,
u(z) + [u(x)− u(z)]ν(A ∪ C) = u(y) + [u(x)− u(y)]ν(C) (21)
and, moreover, we have
I
[∫
E
u(xAzBy)dνE),
∫
Ec
u(xAzBy)dνEc
]
= u(y) (22)
hence
u(z) + [u(y)− u(z)]ν(A ∪ C) + [u(x)− u(y)]ν(A) = u(y) (23)
W.l.o.g. we normalize the utility function u(.) such that u(x) = 1 et u(z) = 0. Equation
(18) yields
u(y) =
ν(A)
ν(E)
(24)
Equation (21) yields
u(y) =
ν(A ∪ C)− ν(C)
1− ν(C) (25)
and equation (23) yields
u(y) =
ν(A)
1 + ν(A)− ν(A ∪ C) (26)
8
Consequently, by equalizing these last equations,
1 + ν(A)− ν(E)− ν(Ec)
1− ν(Ec) =
ν(A)
ν(E)
(27)
and, if ν not additive on {E,Ec}, then ∃ε ∈ R\{0} such that:
ν(A)− ε
ν(E)− ε =
ν(A)
ν(E)
(28)
If ν(A) 6= ν(E), then ε = 0 which is a contradiction, hence ν is additive on {E,Ec}.
Moreover, because by equation (18) u(y) = νE(A) when A ⊂ E = A ∪ B, axiom 2
implies
∀A ∈ Σ, νE(A) = ν(A ∩ E)
p(E)
(29)
and the same implication holds on Ec. 
Proposition 2 states that when RCA is weakened, the representation I is additive
only on the subset {xEy ∈ X2|∃f ∈ A : f ∼E x, f ∼Ec y} of binary acts. Sarin
and Wakker (1998) found a similar result with different assumptions: they assumed
dynamic consistency, consequentialism and their sequential consistency property.
Another way to avoid expected utility is to do not assume consequentialism. How-
ever, given any event E in Σ, all updating rules commonly used to condition Choquet
capacities imply νEc(A) = 0 when A ⊂ Ec. Then a relevant question may be: How
define conditional capacities if we do not explicitly assume that counterfactual out-
comes do not matter ? We give a partial answer to this question by characterizing the
conditional capacity in several situations.
Proposition 3 Let {<E}E∈Σ be a class of preference relations on A. If {<E}E∈Σ
satisfy CEU and axiom 1, then for all A,E in Σ:
i If A ⊂ E, then
νE(A) =
ν(A ∩ E)
ν(E)
(30)
ii If E ⊂ A, then
νEc(A) =
ν((A ∩ Ec) ∪ E)− ν(E)
1− ν(E) (31)
iii If Ec ⊂ A, then
νE(A) =
ν((A ∩ E) ∪ Ec)− ν(Ec)
1− ν(Ec) (32)
iv If A ⊂ Ec, then
νEc(A) =
ν(A ∩ Ec)
ν(Ec)
(33)
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Proof Applied to the characteristic function of any event A, CEU and axiom 1 yield∫
S
1Adν = I
[∫
S
1AdνE,
∫
S
1AdνEc
]
(34)
where
∫
S
1Adν = ν(A),
∫
S
1AdνE = νE(A) and
∫
S
1AdνEc = νEc(A). Then,
(i) A ⊂ E ⇒ νE(A) ≥ νEc(A) = 0 hence ν(A) = νE(A)ν(E).
(ii) E ⊂ A⇒ νE(A) = 1 ≥ νEc(A) hence ν(A) = νEc(A) + [1− νEc(A)]ν(E).
(iii) Ec ⊂ A⇒ νEc(A) = 1 ≥ νE(A) hence ν(A) = νE(A) + [1− νE(A)]ν(Ec).
(iv) A ⊂ Ec ⇒ νEc(A) ≥ νE(A) = 0 hence ν(A) = νEc(A)ν(Ec).

Therefore, the recursive relation allowed by RCA defines an updating rule for ν.
Given any event E in Σ, it consists to use the Bayes’ rule when A ⊂ E and the
Dempster-Shafer’s rule when Ec ⊂ A to calculate νE. These rules have been previously
axiomatized by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993) for the case where ν is convex (see also
Wang, 2003, for the general case).
To see that this updating rule can violate consequentialism, let S = (A ∪ B ∪ C),
A ∩ B = B ∩ C = A ∩ C = ∅, E = (A ∪ B), f = xAyBz and g = xAyBz′, with
z′ ≥ x ≥ y ≥ z. Then the conditional capacity in ∫ u(f)dνE is given by statement (i)
whereas the conditional capacity in
∫
u(g)dνE is given by statement (iii). Therefore,
IE[u(f)] and IE[u(g)] differ in general and axiom 2 fails to hold.
4 Maximin Expected Utility
In this section, we suppose that the DM considers a non-empty, compact and convex
set P of finitely additive probability measures, and maximizes expected utility with
respect to the lower probability. MEU over Savage acts is axiomatized in Ghirardato
et al. (2001, 2003)4.
Definition 2 (MEU) The preference relation is represented by a Maximin Expected
Utility functional I : A −→ R if there exist a non-empty, compact and convex set P
of finitely additive probability measures on Σ and a real-valued function u : X → R,
unique up to a positive affine transformation, s.t. the value of any f is given by:
I : f 7−→ min
p∈P
∫
S
u[f(s)]dp(s)
Moreover, given an event E, the conditional MEU of f , noted min
pE∈PE
∫
S
u(f)dpE, uses the
set of conditional probabilities PE.
Again, a way to avoid expected utility is to weaken axiom 1 into axiom 3. The
following result states that a necessary and sufficient condition to weak reduction of
4Other axiomatizations are Casadesus-Masanell et al. (2000) and Alon and Schmeidler (2009).
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compound acts and consequentialism within the multiple priors framework is the rect-
angularity of the set of priors. Because the former implies backward induction on a
given and fixed filtration, it is convenient to distinguish the restriction of P to {E,Ec}
and we note it P(E,Ec) = {m ∈ P|m : {E,Ec} −→]0; 1[}.
Proposition 4 Let {<E}E∈Σ be a class of preference relations on A. Then the follow-
ing two statements are equivalent:
i {<E}E∈Σ satisfy MEU and axioms 2 and 3;
ii There exist E and Ec in Σ and a compact, convex and non-empty set of priors
P such that
P(A) =
{∫
S
pB(A)dm|A ⊂ B ∈ {E,Ec}, pB ∈ PB,m ∈ P(E,Ec)
}
(35)
and < is represented by
I : f 7−→ min
m∈P(E,Ec)
∫
S
(
min
pE∈PE
∫
S
u(f)dpE, min
pEc∈PEc
∫
S
u(f)dpEc
)
dm (36)
where u : X −→ R is unique up to a positive affine transformation.
Proof (ii) ⇒ (i) is straightforward. We prove (i) ⇒ (ii). For all A ⊂ B ∈ {E,Ec},
MEU and axioms 2 and 3 imply:
min
p∈P
∫
S
1Adp = min
m∈P(E,Ec)
m(B) · min
pB∈PB
∫
S
1AdpB (37)
hence p∗(A) = min
m∈P(E,Ec)
m(B) · min
pB∈PB
pB(A), with p∗ ∈ arg min
p∈P
∫
S
1Adp. Let p
∗ ∈
arg min
p∈P
∫
S
1Acdp. Because p
∗(A) = max
p∈P
p(A) = 1− I[min ∫
E
1AcdpE,min
∫
Ec
1AcdpEc ] =
1−I[1− max
pB∈PB
pB(A), 1] = 1−{ max
m∈P(E,Ec)
m(B)[1− max
pB∈PB
pB(A)]+1− max
m∈P(E,Ec)
m(B)} =
max
m∈P(E,Ec)
m(B) · max
pB∈PB
pB(A),
p∗(A) ≤ m(B)p(A)
p(B)
≤ p∗(A) (38)
for any m in P(E,Ec) and any pB in PB. Then, ∃α ∈ [0, 1] such that
αp∗(A) + (1− α)p∗(A) = m(B)p(A)
p(B)
(39)
By convexity of P , P(A) = {αp∗(A) + (1− α)p∗(A)|α ∈ [0; 1]} and then, by convexity
of P(E,Ec) and PB,
P(A) =
{∫
S
pB(A)dm|A ⊂ B ∈ {E,Ec}, pB ∈ PB,m ∈ P(E,Ec)
}
(40)

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Statement (ii) in the proposition says that the set P is rectangular. Such a condition
has been introduced by Epstein and Schneider (2003), and the reader is referred to their
article for an extensive discussion of this concept.
Symmetrically to the CEU model, if one wish to keep axiom 1, then we cannot
assume consequentialism. In the MEU framework, this means that we have to update
such and such subset of P , depending on counterfactual outcomes.
Proposition 5 Let {<E}E∈Σ be a class of preference relations on A. If {<E}E∈Σ
satisfy MEU and axiom 1, then for all A,E in Σ:
i If A ⊂ E, then
PE(A) =
{
pE(A) =
p(A ∩ E)
p(E)
|p ∈ arg min
p∈P
p(E)
}
(41)
ii If E ⊂ A, then
PEc(A) =
{
pEc(A) =
p(A ∩ Ec)
p(Ec)
|p ∈ arg max
p∈P
p(Ec)
}
(42)
iii If Ec ⊂ A, then
PE(A) =
{
pE(A) =
p(A ∩ E)
p(E)
|p ∈ arg max
p∈P
p(E)
}
(43)
iv If A ⊂ Ec, then
PEc(A) =
{
pEc(A) =
p(A ∩ Ec)
p(Ec)
|p ∈ arg min
p∈P
p(Ec)
}
(44)
Proof Applied to the characteristic function of any event A, MEU and axiom 1 yield
min
p∈P
∫
S
1Adp = I
[
min
pE∈PE
∫
S
1AdpE, min
pEc∈PEc
∫
S
1AdpEc
]
(45)
where min
p∈P
∫
S
1Adp = min
p∈P
p(A), min
pE∈PE
∫
S
1AdpE = min
pE∈PE
pE(A) and min
pEc∈PEc
∫
S
1AdpEc =
min
pEc∈PEc
pEc(A). Then,
(i) Let p ∈ arg min
p∈P
∫
S
1Adp. A ⊂ E ⇒ min
pE∈PE
pE(A) ≥ min
pEc∈PEc
pEc(A) = 0 hence
p(A) = min
pE∈PE
pE(A) ·min
p∈P
p(E). Moreover, p(A) = pE(A)p(E). If p(E) > min
p∈P
p(E),
then pE(A) < min
pE∈PE
pE(A) which is a contradiction. Therefore, p ∈ arg min
p∈P
∫
S
1Adp⋂
arg min
p∈P
∫
S
1Edp and then
min
pE∈PE
pE(A) =
p(A ∩ E)
p(E)
(46)
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(ii) Let p ∈ arg min
p∈P
∫
S
1Adp. E ⊂ A ⇒ min
pE∈PE
pE(A) = 1 ≥ min
pEc∈PEc
pEc(A) hence
min
p∈P
p(A) = min
pEc∈PEc
pEc(A) + [1 − min
pEc∈PEc
pEc(A)]min
p∈P
p(E) = min
pEc∈PEc
pEc(A)[1 −
min
p∈P
p(E)] + min
p∈P
p(E). Moreover, p(A) = pEc(A)p(E
c) +p(E) and 0 ≤ pEc(A) ≤ 1.
If p(E) > min
p∈P
p(E), then p(A) > pEc(A)[1 −min
p∈P
p(E)] + min
p∈P
p(E) ≥ p(A) which
is a contradiction. Therefore, p ∈ arg min
p∈P
∫
S
1Adp
⋂
arg min
p∈P
∫
S
1Edp and then
min
pEc∈PEc
pEc(A) =
p(A ∩ Ec)
p(Ec)
(47)
(iii) Let p ∈ arg min
p∈P
∫
S
1Adp. E
c ⊂ A ⇒ min
pEc∈PEc
pEc(A) = 1 ≥ min
pE∈PE
pE(A) hence
min
p∈P
p(A) = min
pE∈PE
pE(A) + [1− min
pE∈PE
pE(A)]min
p∈P
p(Ec). The same argument that in
the previous case implies p ∈ arg min
p∈P
∫
S
1Adp
⋂
arg min
p∈P
∫
S
1Ecdp.
(iv) Let p ∈ arg min
p∈P
∫
S
1Adp. A ⊂ Ec ⇒ min
pEc∈PEc
pEc(A) ≥ min
pE∈PE
pE(A) = 0 hence
min
p∈P
p(A) = min
pEc∈PEc
pEc(A)min
p∈P
p(Ec). The same argument that in the case (i)
implies p ∈ arg min
p∈P
∫
S
1Adp
⋂
arg min
p∈P
∫
S
1Ecdp.

Therefore, axiom 1 allows us to obtain an updating rule for MEU preferences. Note
that statements (ii) and (iii) of the proposition correspond to the use of the maximum
likelihood procedure applied to P (see Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1993). Again, such a
way of updating is not consequentialist in general. Furthermore, it coincides with the
updating rule obtained in proposition 3 for CEU preferences when there exists a convex
capacity (see Chateauneuf et al., 2001).
5 Conclusion
We have shown that if we assume reduction of compound acts and consequentialism
together with a monotonic constant linear representation, then we obtain the classical
EU model from Savage (1954) with additive beliefs. The novelty of our approach is
that we explicitly assume a reduction of compound acts axiom. Its weakening allows
us to reviewed some existing results and to avoid expected utility. Notably, concerning
MEU preferences, the set of priors must be rectangular.
However, when the DM’s preferences exhibit typical violations of the Savage’s Sure-
thing principle, the recursive structure of the preferences can be maintained in several
situations if we drop consequentialism, in the sense that conditional preferences are
depending on counterfactuals outcomes. Further, Reduction of compound acts has not
to be weaken. It can be suitable for economic applications when, for instance, one
wish to compare dynamic situations where uncertainty is differently resolved. Then we
axiomatize an updating rule for CEU and MEU preferences allowing recursion. In our
knowledge, such a way of updating is the only one to be dynamically consistent but
13
non-consequentialist in the CEU framework. Concerning MEU preferences, Hanany
and Klibanoff (2007) also propose a non-consequentialist updating rule. However, in
their setting, this means that ex-ante preferences determine conditional preferences by
selecting such and such subset of the set of priors when conditioning. They assume a
weakened form of dynamic consistency that does not allow recursion.
In our agenda for future search, we consider a behavioral interpretation of the up-
dating rules deduced in this paper.
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